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1992]
CRIMINAL LAW-NEW

STANDARDS

UNDER THE SENTENCING

GUIDELINES

United States v. Kikumura (1990).
I.

INTRODUCTION

In the federal courts, criminal sentences are determined under the
United States Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines).' The Guidelines
prescribe a sentencing range in which a defendant must be sentenced as
a general rule.2 In limited circumstances, the government may seek an
upward departure and obtain a sentence greater than that prescribed by
the Guidelines. 3 In either case, however, a defendant is only entitled to
4
the procedural protections generally available at sentencing hearings.
In United States v. Kikumura, 5 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit strengthened the procedural protections available to
defendants in the sentencing context. 6 More specifically, the Kikumura
court established new standards to guide the district courts in sentencing hearings where the government seeks an "extreme departure" from
existing sentencing guidelines. 7 These new, more protective standards
for determining appropriate sentences relate to the following issues: 1)
the burden of proof in factfinding, 2) the admission of hearsay evidence
and 3) the method for determining the reasonableness of departures
8
from the sentencing guidelines.
II.

FACTS

On the morning of April 12, 1988, a New Jersey State Trooper
stopped a vehicle for reckless driving at a service area on the New Jersey
1. See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMM'N, FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (rev. ed. 1988) [hereinafter GUIDELINES].
See generally Stephen
Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon Which They
Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1 (1988) ("Since November 1987, the new Federal
Sentencing Guidelines have been law.").
2. For a further discussion of the sentencing procedures under the Guidelines, see infra note 20.
3. For a further discussion of permissible departures from the Guidelines,
see infra note 21.
4. See United States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084, 1099-1101 (3d Cir. 1990).
For a further discussion of the procedural protections available at sentencing
hearings, see infra notes 29-36 and accompanying text.

5. 918 F.2d 1084 (3d Cir. 1990).
6. Id. at 1098-1119.
7. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's Kikumura opinion, see infra notes
29-84 and accompanying text.
8. For a discussion of the Kikumura court's holdings regarding these three
issues, see infra notes 29-84 and accompanying text.

(1050)

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1992

1

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 4 [1992], Art. 19

1992]

THIRD CIRCUIT REVIEW

1051

Turnpike. 9 When the trooper approached the car, he observed a cardboard box containing three red cylindrical objects with black tape and
wires in the passenger compartment.1 0 He asked the driver what the
objects were and the driver replied: "Souvenirs. Go ahead, check it
out."' I The trooper discovered that the objects were home-made explosives and he arrested the driver, Yu Kikumura.1 2 Kikumura, an internationally trained terrorist, was driving toward New York City to carry
3
out a bombing at a navy and marine recruiting center.'
Kikumura was charged with various crimes, including the violation
of a federal law that prohibits transporting explosives in interstate commerce "with the knowledge or intent that [the explosives] will be used to
kill, injure, or intimidate any individual or unlawfully to damage or destroy any building, vehicle, or real or personal property."' 14 After the
trial court denied his suppression motion, Kikumura stipulated to all the
essential facts of the charged offenses and waived his right to a jury
trial. '5 However, Kikumura denied that he had intended to injure or kill
any individuals with his explosives. 16 He only conceded that he had intended to damage or destroy property. 17 After a pro forma bench trial
18
on the stipulated facts, Kikumura was convicted of all counts.
Kikumura's sentence was governed by the Sentencing Reform Act
of 1984 and the Guidelines promulgated thereunder.' 9 Under the
9. Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1090.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. The Third Circuit affirmed the district court's finding that Kikumura

had consented to the search of his car. Id. at 1093. According to the court, a
determination that consent was voluntary is a finding of fact. Id. (citing

Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973)). Therefore, the finding is
subject only to clearly erroneous review. Id. (citing United States v. Kelly, 708
F.2d 121, 126 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 916 (1983)).
13. Id. at 1095. The police discovered a map of New York City in
Kikumura's car. Id. The map was marked at a spot one half block from a navy
and marine recruiting center. Id. At Kikumura's sentencing hearing, a detective
speculated that Kikumura intended to detonate the bombs at the recruiting office. Id.
14. Id. at 1094 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 844(d) (1988)). Kikumura was also
charged with one count of transporting explosives without a license, (18 U.S.C.
§ 842(a)(3)(A) (1988)), one count of possessing a firearm as an illegal alien, (18
U.S.C. § 9 2 2 (g)(5) (1988)), three counts of possessing unregistered firearms,
(26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) (1988)), three counts of possessing firearms without serial
numbers, (26 U.S.C. § 5861(i) (1988)), and three passport and visa offenses, (18
U.S.C. §§ 1543-1544, 1546(a) (1988)). Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1094 n.6.
15. Id. at 1094.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. The court applied the October 1988 Guidelines in sentencing
Kikumura. Id. at 1094 n.7. According to federal law, a sentencing court must
consider:
The kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established for the ap-
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Guidelines, the district court could have sentenced Kikumura to serve
between twenty-seven to thirty-three months in prison. 20 However, the
government moved for an "upward departure" because of the seriousness of Kikumura's conduct. 2 ' Granting the government's motion, the
district court imposed a sentence of thirty years imprisonment-"apparently the largest departure from an applicable guideline range, in absolute or percentage terms, since the sentencing guidelines became
22
effective."
Kikumura appealed the sentence, and the Third Circuit's decision
in United States v. Kikumura 23 established important precedent for deciding five critical issues: (1) the appropriate standard of proof governing
factfinding in cases which depart significantly from the sentencing range
set forth in the Guidelines; (2) the admissibility, for sentencing purposes, of hearsay statements made by a confidential informant; (3)
whether the Sentencing Commission sufficiently considered a situation
such as Kikumura's in fashioning the Guideline range; 24 (4) the stanplicable category of offense committed by the applicable category of
defendant as set forth in the guidelines that are issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 944(a)(1) and that are in effect
on the date the defendant is sentenced.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4) (1988).
20. Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1094. Under the Guidelines, the sentencing
court uses a series of calculations to determine a defendant's sentence. See
GUIDELINES, supra note 1, § IB 1.1. First, the court determines which Guideline
section is most analogous to the statute of conviction. Id. § lBl.l(a). Second,
the court uses the Guidelines to determine a "base offense level," and then adjusts that level by applying specific characteristics from the defendant's offense.
Id. § IB1.1 (b). Third, the court may make additional adjustments to the offense
level based upon the identity of the victim of the crime, the defendant's role in
the crime, and the defendant's obstruction of justice. Id. § B 1.1 (c). Fourth, if
the defendant has been convicted of multiple counts, the court repeats the process and groups the calculated offense levels. Id. § I B1.l(d). Fifth, the court
applies the defendant's acceptance of responsibility, if any, to the previously calculated offense level to determine the total offense level. Id. § 1B 1.1 (e). Sixth,
the court determines the criminal history category of the defendant. Id.
§ l B 1.1 (f). The criminal history category considers a defendant's prior criminal
conduct. Id. at 201. Finally, the court applies the appropriate Guideline range
corresponding to the total offense level and criminal history category. Id.
§ IBl.l(g).
21. Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1094. The government relied on the following
provision in the Guidelines:
The [Sentencing] Commission intends the sentencing courts to treat
each guideline as carving out a "heartland," a set of typical cases embodying the conduct that each guideline describes. When a court finds
an atypical case, one to which a particular guideline linguistically applies but where conduct significantly differs from the norm, the court
may consider whether a departure is warranted.
GUIDELINES,

supra note 1, at 6.

22. Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1089.
23. 918 F.2d 1084 (3d Cir. 1990).
24. Id. at 1089. A district court is required to sentence a defendant within
an applicable guideline range "unless the court finds that there exists an aggra-
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dards applied to determine the reasonableness of departures; and (5)
25
the reasonableness of the actual sentence imposed on Kikumura.
The Third Circuit concluded that: (1) the government must meet a
clear and convincing standard of proof in establishing the facts when
there is an "extreme departure" from a sentencing range prescribed by
the Guidelines; (2) because they were based on corroborating evidence,
the hearsay statements were sufficiently reliable to be admissible against
Kikumura for sentencing purposes; (3) "the circumstances of
Kikumura's offense were not adequately contemplated by the Sentencing Commission and hence an upward departure was permitted;"' 26 (4)
the reasonableness of departures can be determined by analogizing the
defendant's offense to existing Guidelines; 27 and (5) under the facts of
Kikumura, a sentence of 360 months was unreasonable, but a sentence of
28
up to 262 months would be reasonable.
III.
A.

DISCUSSION

Burden of Proof in Factfinding

In Kikumura, the Third Circuit acknowledged that the procedural
protections guaranteed to defendants at sentencing are significantly less
than those guaranteed at trial.2 9 For example, a criminal defendant has
vating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken
into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the Guidelines
that should result in a sentence different from that described." Id. at 1098
(quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1988)). "This provision is mandatory." Id. (quoting United States v. Uca, 867 F.2d 783, 786 (3d Cir. 1989)). If the lower court
departs from the Guildelines in a situation where the factors were adequately
considered by the Sentencing Commission, then the reviewing court must reverse. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3742(0)(1) (1988)). The scope of review of this
issue is plenary. Id. (citing United States v. Ryan, 866 F.2d 604, 610 (3d Cir.
1989)).
25. Id. at 1089. Upon determining that a departure is permitted, the court
must decide whether the actual sentence is reasonable. Id. The court's decision
must take into account "(A) the factors to be considered in imposing a sentence,
as set forth in [18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)]; and (B) the reasons for the imposition of
the particular sentence, as stated by the district court pursuant to the provisions
of section 3553(c)." Id. at 1098 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)(3) (1988)). The
Kikumura court required that the factors relied upon by the sentencing court and
the degree of departure from sentencing guidelines be "appropriate." Id. The
scope of review at this stage is deferential. Id. (citing United States v. Ryan, 866
F.2d 604, 610 (3d Cir. 1989)).
26. Id. at 1089. For a discussion of the test used to determine whether a
factor was adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission,
see supra note 24.
27. For a discussion of the court's methodology for determining the reasonableness of departures, see infra notes 67-77 and accompanying text.
28. Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1089. For a discussion of the reasonablenesss of
the actual departure, see infra notes 78-84 and accompanying text.
29. Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1099; see also United States v. Palma, 760 F.2d
475, 477 (3d Cir. 1985)(although defendant must be afforded some degree of
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the right to trial by jury; however, there is no such right at sentencing.30
At trial, each element of a charged offense must be proven beyond a
reasonable doubt; 3 ' however, at sentencing those elements need only
32
be established by a preponderance of the evidence.
In addition, at sentencing, the defendant does not benefit from the
protections of the Federal Rules of Evidence and the Confrontation
Clause as he or she does at trial."3 The Confrontation Clause 3 4 prevents the use of admissible hearsay unless the evidence is supported by a
"firmly rooted hearsay exception" or other "particularized guarantees
of trustworthiness."-3 5 At sentencing, however, due process only requires that hearsay "bear 'some minimal indicium of reliability beyond
'mere allegation.' "36
According to the Kikumura court, the diminished procedural protections available at sentencing are ordinarily justified.3 7 The court noted,
however, that these diminished protections are not adequate in all
cases.3 8 In Kikumura, the Third Circuit considered the sentencing hearing "a tail which wags the dog of the substantive offense."13 9 In such an
extreme situation, "a court (must not] reflexively apply the truncated
procedures that are perfectly adequate for all of the more mundane, familiar sentencing determinations."-40 Instead, the prosecutor must establish the facts underlying any departure from the Guidelines by clear
41
and convincing evidence.
due process at sentencing hearing, same degree of due process as at trial is not
required).
30. Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1099 (citing Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447,
459 (1984) (holding no right to jury at sentencing)).
31. Id. (citing In re Winshop, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (holding right to
proof beyond a reasonable doubt at trial)).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 1099-1100. The Federal Rules of Evidence provide that "[t]hese
rules govern proceedings in the courts of the United States .... FED. R. EvID.
101. However, Rule 1101 provides that "[t]he rules ... do not apply in ...
sentencing." FED. R. EvID. l101(d)(3).
34. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI, cl. 3. The Sixth Amendment provides, in
relevant part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right...
to be confronted with the witnesses against him ...." Id.
35. Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1099-1100 (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S.
56, 66 (1980)).
36. Id. (quoting United States v. Baylin, 696 F.2d 1030, 1040 (3d Cir.
1982)).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1100-01 (quoting McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 88
(1986)). The court noted that it was dealing with a departure "that would increase Kikumura's sentence from about 30 months to 30 years-the equivalent of
a 22-level increase in his offense level." Id. at 1100.
40. Id. at 1101.
41. Id. Except in these extreme circumstances, the Third Circuit rejected
the idea that a defendant could have greater or lesser procedural protections
depending on the nature of the case by stating that "procedural protection can-
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The court distinguished Kikumura from the weight of authority in
other circuits which hold that the prosector need only prove Guideline
factors by a preponderance of the evidence. 4 2 The Kikumura court
noted that none of the other cases involved a departure as extreme as
that in Kikumura.4 3 Specifically, the Guidelines prescribed a sentence of
twenty-seven to thirty-three months for Kikumura's conduct, while the
district court sentenced him to thirty years imprisonment. 44 This departure was apparently the largest in the history of the Guidelines. 45 Accordingly, the Third Circuit determined that for such an extreme
departure from the Guidelines, the government should bear a more onerous burden in establishing the facts supporting a departure than for a
46
typical case.
B.

Admissibility of Hearsay Evidence

The Third Circuit also departed from its usual standard for deter47
mining the admissibility of hearsay evidence in the sentencing phase.
The Kikumura court declined to follow the standard set forth in United
States v. Baylin. 4 8 In Baylin, the Third Circuit concluded that a court can
consider hearsay statements as a basis for sentencing as long as they are
at least minimally reliable. 49 According to the Kikumura court, however,
cases of "extreme" departures from the Guidelines require an examination of "the totality of the circumstances, including other corroborating
evidence, and [a] determin[ation of] whether the hearsay declarations
not be calibrated on a sliding-scale, case-by-case basis." Id. at 1100. The court
noted that "if proof by a mere preponderance is sufficient to justify a two-level
increase for willfully impeding an investigation, then proof by that identical standard is appropriate in order to justify ... a four-level increase for organizing an

offense; or a six-level increase for unlawfully receiving explosives that one knows
to be stolen." Id. For a description of how offense levels are determined under
the Guidelines, see supra note 20.
42. Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1101-02. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 900
F.2d 1350, 1354 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding preponderance of evidence sufficient
proof of monetary value of goods in mail fraud scheme); United States v. Frederick, 897 F.2d 490, 493 (10th Cir.) (holding preponderance of evidence sufficient
proof of noncharged criminal activity for use in computing sentence), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 171 (1990); United States v. Guerra, 888 F.2d 247, 250-51 (2d Cir.
1989)(same), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1090 (1990).
43. Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1102.
44. Id. at 1089.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1102. "We hold that the clear and convincing evidence standard
is, under these circumstances, implicit in the statutory requirement that a sentencing court 'find' certain considerations in order to justify a departure [from
the Guidelines]." Id.
47. Id.
48. 696 F.2d 1030 (3d Cir. 1982).
49. Id. at 1040. In Baylin, the district court used the government's agreement not to prosecute the defendant to infer that the defendant may have engaged in illegal activities. Id. at 1035. The Baylin court, however, concluded that
reliance upon such an agreement was impermissible in sentencing. Id. at 1042.
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are reasonably trustworthy. ' 50 Thus, a sentencing court should apply
an intermediate standard, stricter than that set forth in Baylin for ordinary sentencing, but less strict than the standard applicable at trial. 5 1
The Kikumura court also refused to adopt the reasoning of the
Eighth Circuit in United States v. Fortier.52 In Fortier, the Eighth Circuit
utilized the standard for the admissibility of hearsay at trial to review a
district court's reliance upon a hearsay statement to increase a defendant's sentence. 53 The Eighth Circuit reasoned that the Confrontation
Clause required this test. 54 However, the Third Circuit disagreed, noting that the intermediate standard it adopted in Kikumura "satisfies the
reliability concerns that undergird Fortier, while at the same time avoiding the doctrinal pitfalls that would accompany [applying the Confronta' 55
tion Clause to sentencing hearings]."

C.

Permissibility of Departure

The Third Circuit then examined whether the departure from the
Guidelines was permissible in Kikumura.5 6 A district court can only de50. Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1103. In addition, the Kikumura court noted that
in assessing the reliability of a hearsay statement, the sentencing court's inquiry
is not limited to "circumstances that surround the making of the statement." Id.
at 1103 n.21 (quoting Idaho v. Wright, 110 S. Ct. 3139 (1990)). Indeed, where
there is an extreme departure from the Guidelines, a court is required to consider other evidence that substantiates the proffered hearsay statement. Id.
The Kikumura court found that the proferred hearsay evidence, the informant's testimony regarding Kikumura's activities in a terrorist camp, met this
more stringent standard because the testimony was verified by corrobative evidence. Id. at 1103-04.
51. Id. at 1102-03. In Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), the Supreme
Court set the standard for admitting hearsay evidence at trial. Id. at 66. The
Court held that the Confrontation Clause of the United States Constitution forbids consideration at trial of all admissible hearsay unsupported by "a firmly
rooted hearsay exception" or other "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness." Id.
52. 911 F.2d 100 (8th Cir. 1990). In Fortier, the district court had relied
upon the defendant's pre-sentence report to conclude that the defendant had
possessed cocaine. Id. at 102. The pre-sentence report, however, contained
triple hearsay. Id. at 104. According to the Eighth Circuit, using this report
violated the defendant's rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. Id. For the text of the Confrontation Clause, see supra note 34.
53. Fortier, 911 F.2d at 103; see also Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1103 n.19.
54. Fortier, 911 F.2d at 104. The Eighth Circuit relied upon the applicability of the Confrontation Clause to hearsay statements. Id. at 103-04.
55. Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1103 n.19. According to the Kikumura court,
"[als a textual matter, the sixth amendment, which refers to 'criminal prosecutions,' arguably applies only at trial." Id. at 1102. Therefore, the court was reluctant to apply the Confrontation Clause to the sentencing process. Id.
56. Id. at 1103-09. Before deciding whether the extreme departure from
the Guidelines was permissible on the facts of Kikumura, the Third Circuit upheld the district court's finding that Kikumura intended to use his bombs to
injure people. Id. at 1104. Kikumura claimed that he had not intended to use
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part from the sentencing range set forth in the Guidelines if it finds an
aggravating or mitigating circumstance that the Sentencing Commission
did not sufficiently consider in formulating the Guidelines. 5 7 The cir58
cumstance "should result in a sentence different from that described."
59
This requirement is mandatory. In addition, in making this determination, the sentencing court "shall consider only the sentencing guidelines, policy statements, and official commentary of the Sentencing
Commission."60

Kikumura was sentenced under six Guidelines. 6 1 He contended
that the Sentencing Commission considered, and factored into the base
level, the defendant's intent to commit murder in three of the Guidelines under which he was sentenced: the explosives 6 2 Guideline as well
his bombs to injure people. Id. at 1094. He claimed that he only intended to
destroy property. Id.
57. Id. at 1098 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)).

58. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1988)).
59. United States v. Uca, 867 F.2d 783, 786 (3d Cir. 1989) (interpreting 18
U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1988)).
60. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1988).
61. Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1104 (citing GUIDELINES, supra note 1). Specifically, the court looked to guidelines §§ 2K1.3 (unlawfully trafficking in, receiving, or transporting explosives), 2K1.6 (shipping, transporting, or receiving
explosives with felonious intent or knowledge; using or carrying explosives in
certain crimes), 2K2.1 (receipt, possession, of transportation of firearms and

other weapons by prohibited persons), 2K2.2 (receipt, possession, or transportation or firearms and other weapons in violation of National Firearms Act),
2L2.2 (fraudulently acquiring evidence of citizenship or documents authorizing
entry for own use) and 2L2.4 (fraudulently acquiring or improperly using a
United States passport). Id. Kikumura conceded that §§ 2K1.3, 2L2.2, and
2L2.4 did not consider his intent to commit murder. Id. at 1104. In addition,
Kikumura conceded that his previous arrest for similar offenses supported an
offender-related departure under § 4AI.3. Id. Section 4AI.3 authorizes a departure "[i]f reliable information indicates that the criminal history category
does not adequately reflect the seriousness of the defendant's past criminal con-

duct ...." GUIDELINES, supra note 1, § 4A1.3.
62. Section 2KI.6, the explosives guideline, provides in relevant part:
Shipping, Transporting, or Receiving Explosives with Felonious Intent or Knowledge; Using or Carrying Explosives in Certain Crimes
-(a) Base Offense Level (Apply the greater):
(1) 18; or
(2) If the defendant committed the offense with intent to commit
another offense against a person or property, apply § 2X1l (Attempt
or Conspiracy) in respect to such other offense.
GUIDELINES,

supra note 1, § 2KI.6.

Kikumura was mistakenly sentenced under § 2K1.6(a)(1). Kikumura, 918
F.2d at 1106 n.27. The Third Circuit noted that 18 U.S.C. § 844(d) (1988) covers two classes of offenders: "those who transport explosives themselves intending to harm people and damage property, and those who transport
explosives themselves with intent or knowledge that others will or might use them
to harm people or damage property." Id. at 1105. In the court's view, if a
defendant intended to kill people, he should be sentenced under § 2KI.6(a)(2).
However, if he did not intend to kill people, he should be sentenced under
§ 2KI.6(a)(1).
Id. at 1105-06. Because Kikumura was sentenced under
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as the two firearms 65 Guidelines. 6 4 However, the court disagreed and
found that under the specific language of these Guidelines, the Sentencing Commission had not adequately considered intent to murder into
the base level. 6 5 Therefore, the trial court's departure in sentencing was
66
permissible.
D.

The Reasonableness of the Departure

The Kikumura court then considered whether the magnitude of the
departure itself was reasonable. 67 According to the court, Congress expressly directs that courts of appeals should affirm "all departures that
§ 2KI.6(a)(1), which did not consider his intent to commit murder, the district
court's departure was permissible. Id.
63. Section 2K2.1 provides in relevant part:
Receipt, Possession, or Transportationof Firearmsand Other Weapons by Prohibited Persons
(a) Base Offense Level: 9
(b) Specific Offense Characteristics
(2) If the defendant obtained or possessed the firearm solely for
sport or recreation, decrease by 4 levels.
(c) Cross Reference
(1) If the defendant used the firearm in committing or attempting
another offense, apply the guideline in respect to such other offense, or
§ 2X 1.1 (Attempt or Conspiracy) if the resulting offense level is higher
than that determined above.
GuIDELINES, supra note 1, § 2K2.1.
Section 2K2.2 provides in relevant part:
Receipt, Possession or Transportationof Firearms and Other Weapons in Violation
of National Firearms Act
(a) Base Offense Level: 12
(b) Specific Offense Characteristics
(3) If the defendant obtained or possessed firearm solely for sport,
recreation, or collection, decrease by 6 levels.
(c) Cross Reference
(1) If the defendant used the firearm in committing or attempting
another offense, apply the guideline for such other offense or § 2X 1.1
(Attempt or Conspiracy), if the resulting offense level is higher than
that determined above.
Id. § 2K2.2. The Third Circuit noted that the firearms guidelines start with a
presumption that when a defendant illegally possesses weapons, he intends to
use them unlawfully. Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1109. The court nevertheless concluded that a general intent to use the firearms unlawfully is sufficiently different
from the intended unlawful use of shooting and killing someone that the consideration of intended unlawful uses generally in the base offense levels in
§§ 2K2.1(a) and 2K2.2(a) did not preclude departure on the basis of an intent to
commit murder. Id.
64. Id. at 1104.
65. Id. at 1109.
66. Id. at 1109.
67. Id. at 1110.
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are not unreasonable." '6 8 Thus, the district courts are entitled to "a substantial amount of discretion" in making this determination. 69 Quoting
the First Circuit Court of Appeals, the Kikumura court noted:
District courts are in the front lines, sentencing flesh-and-blood
defendants. The dynamics of the situation may be difficult to
gauge from the antiseptic nature of a sterile paper record.
Therefore, appellate review must occur with full awareness of,
70
and respect for, the trier's superior 'feel' for the case.
Following the lead of other courts of appeals, the Third Circuit concluded that a reviewing court must use objective standards to determine
whether or not a departure is reasonable. 7 1 The Third Circuit further
found that the Guidelines themselves provide these objective standards,
and that a reviewing court must analogize to the Guidelines to make this
72
determination.
Moreover, the court reasoned that analogies to the Guidelines are
useful for determining what offense level a defendant's conduct resem74
bles. 7 3 The court noted that there are two categories of analogies.
First, a court could analogize to aggravating conduct that would constitute a separate offense under a different Guideline. 75 Second, a court
could analogize to an aggravating circumstance that constitutes a special
offense characteristic in Guidelines other than those applied to the de68. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3742(f)(3) (1988)). Section 3742(0(3) provides
that unless a court of appeals finds that a sentence was imposed in violation of
law or was imposed as a result of an incorrect application of the Guidelines, and
thus is unreasonable, "it shall affirm the sentence." 18 U.S.C. § 3742(0(3)
(1988).
69. Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1110 (citing United States v. Ryan, 866 F.2d 604,
610 (3d Cir. 1989)).
70. Id. (quoting United States v. Diaz-Villafane, 874 F.2d 43, 49-50 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 862 (1989)).

71. Id. at 1110. The Kikumura court reasoned that "fidelity to the policy
undergirding the guidelines requires us at least to strive for some principled
basis for reviewing the reasonableness of departures." Id. at 1110-11; see also
United States v. Ferra, 900 F.2d 1057, 1062 (7th Cir. 1990) (requiring use of

objective standards in evaluating departures or sentencing disparity will reappear), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1939 (1992). Numerous circuits have looked to the
Guidelines for sentencing standards. See, e.g., United States v. Landry, 903 F.2d
334, 340-41 (5th Cir. 1990) (evaluating reasonableness of upward depature);
United States v. Ferra, 900 F.2d 1057, 1061-63 (7th Cir. 1990)(evaluating rea-

sonableness of upward depature); United States v. Kim, 896 F.2d 678, 684-85

(2d Cir. 1990)(evaluating reasonableness of upward depature).
72. Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1111. The Kikumura court noted that "[t]he
guidelines themselves prescribe such an approach with respect to offender related departures pursuant to § 4AI.3." Id. In addition, "[a] similar approach is
required by statute when a district court imposes sentence for an offense with no

applicable guideline." Id. at 1112.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1112-13.
75. Id. at 1112.
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fendant. 7 6 By using objective standards and analogies to the Guide-

lines, the Kikumura court concluded that departures from the Guidelines
77
would more likely be upheld as "reasonable.",
E.

The Application of the Methodology to Kikumura

In applying the methodology described above, the Third Circuit
considered each aspect of Kikumura's conduct to determine the appropriate analogies. 7 8 First, the court examined Kikumura's previous arrest
and his involvement in a terrorist training camp abroad to analogize
Kikumura to a repeat offender. 7 9 Second, the Third Circuit upheld the
district court's finding that Kikumura had intended to kill people and,
therefore, analogized him to a defendant sentenced under the attempted murder guideline. 80 Third, the court accounted for Kikimura's
extensive planning and treated it as a specific offense characteristic. 8 '
76. Id. at 1113.
77. See id.
78. Id. at 1114-19.
79. Id. at 1114-15. With no prior convictions in the United States,
Kikumura was classified under the Guidelines as a Category I offender at the
sentencing hearing. Id. at 1094. A Category I offender is the least serious classification under the Guidelines. See GUIDELINES, supra note 1, at 201-17. At
Kikumura's sentencing, however, the government introduced evidence regarding his prior terrorist activities abroad. Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1096. Kikumura
had been arrested on May 1, 1986, at an airport in Amsterdam while attempting
to smuggle over two pounds of TNT flakes into the Netherlands. Id. At the time
of his arrest, Kikumura had six detonators skillfully concealed in a transistor
radio he was carrying. Id. In addition, the FBI provided an affidavit detailing
Kikumura's activities in a terrorist training camp in Lebanon. Id. at 1096-97.
While at the camp, Kikumura trained other members of his organization, the
Japanese Red Army (JRA). Id. at 1097. Based upon these activities, the Third
Circuit thought it reasonable to analogize Kikumura to a Category VI offender.
Id. at 1115. A Category VI offender is the most serious classification under the
Guidelines. See GUIDELINES, supra note 1, at 201-17.
80. Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1115-16. The Kikumura court concluded that the
seriousness of Kikumura's activities warranted an analogy to the attempted murder guideline. Id. at 1115. In fact, the court thought it appropriate to treat
Kikumura like an offender who had attempted six murders. Id. Under the
Guidelines, attempting to kill six people would increase a defendant's offense
level by five levels. Id. The Third Circuit noted that departing any higher than
five levels would fail to comport with the clear and convincing evidence standard. Id. at 1116. For a further discussion of the Third Circuit's adoption of the
clear and convincing evidence standard, see supra notes 29-46 and accompanying text.
81. Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1116. The Third Circuit concluded: "[W]e think
that Kikumura's extraordinarily meticulous planning makes ... his conduct substantially more culpable than that of most defendants charged with attempted
murder." Id. Accordingly, the Third Circuit found that the district court could
reasonably have imposed a two-level increase on this ground. Id. (citing GUIDELINES, supra note 1, § 5K2.0).

The Third Circuit, however, rejected the district court's reliance on the
Guideline for disrupting a governmental function. Id. at 1116. Under this
Guideline, "the Commission intended to punish more harshly criminal conduct
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Finally, the court examined Kikumura's extreme conduct and endangerment of public safety and analogized him to a defendant sentenced
under that guideline. 82 Based on these analogies, the Third Circuit
found that the district court's departure from the Guidelines was unreasonable and remanded the case. 83 On remand, Kikumura was sentenced to 262 months, a three year term of supervised release, and a
special assessment of $600.84
IV.

POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

The Kikumura decision raises important policy questions concerning
prosecutorial discretion. In his concurring opinion, Judge Rosenn discussed the government's manipulation of the charge and the sentencing.8 5 According to Judge Rosenn, "the sentencing guidelines [may]
have replaced judicial discretion over sentencing with prosecutorial discretion." 86 As an example, he pointed out that Kikumura was not convicted of attempted murder, but that was the Guideline the district court
relied upon most when sentencing him. 87 The government, therefore,
had a greater opportunity to obtain a severe sentence in Kikumura because, in a sentencing hearing, Kikumura was not afforded the same procedural protections that would have been provided if he had been
88
charged and tried for multiple attempted murders.
that frustrates the normal, day-to-day operation of government." Id. at 1117.
The Third Circuit decided that Kikumura's conduct did not rise to this level. Id.
82. Id. at 1118-19. The Third Circuit thought that an extreme conduct departure was justified due to the damage Kikumura's bombs would have caused.
Id. The court noted that if the bombs were detonated in a crowded area, "it is
almost a statistical certainty that some people would be killed instantly, others
would escape largely unharmed, and still others would sustain permanent injuries or die slowly from their wounds." Id.
In addition, the court noted that the public safety departure considers that,
had he successfully detonated his bombs in downtown Manhattan, Kikumura
would have significantly endangered the safety and welfare of the general public.
Id. Hence, the court concluded that, under guidelines §§ 5K2.8 and 5K2.14,
"the maximum allowable upward departure for extreme conduct and endangerment of public safety would be five levels." Id. at 1119.
83. Id. at 1119. According to the Third Circuit, Kikumura's offense level
was 32. Id. In addition, Kikumura was categorized as a Category VI offender.
Id. The applicable guideline range for this category is between 210 and 262
months. Id. Therefore, the Third Circuit held that the district court's sentence
of 360 months was unreasonable and set it aside. Id.
84. United States v. Kikumura, 947 F.2d 72, 75 (3d Cir. 1991).
85. Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1119 (Rosenn, J., concurring).
86. Id. (Rosenn, J., concurring). The "[g]overnment's manipulation of
Kikumura's charge and sentencing illustrates the problem reported by many
courts that the sentencing guidelines have replaced judicial discretion over sentencing with prosecutorial discretion." Id. (Rosenn, J., concurring).
87. Id. at 1120 (Rosenn, J., concurring). For a further discussion of the
guidelines relied on by the district court, see supra notes 61-66 and accompanying text.
88. Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1120 (Rosenn, J., concurring). "[T]he Govern-
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Judge Rosenn argued that the Guidelines encourage the government to engage in such a manipulative strategy.8 9 He noted that the
Guidelines permit the sentencing court to consider uncharged criminal
conduct as well as the defendant's intent in committing the offense. 90
Instead of achieving uniformity in sentencing, the Guidelines "have actually had the perverse effect of transferring discretion from the court to
the prosecutor, who then exercises . . . discretion outside the sys-

tem ....91 Although prosecutorial control is not unconstitutional per
se, it is open to abuse and could be applied in such a way as to violate
92
the defendant's due process rights.
V.

CONCLUSION

Kikumura establishes important precedent in the Third Circuit. In
light of Kikumura, criminal defense attorneys should realize that if the
government is moving for an "extreme" upward departure from the
Guidelines, a defendant is entitled to heightened procedural protections.9 3 Namely, the government must prove sentencing facts by clear
and convincing evidence and the sentencing court may consider hearsay
only if it is reasonably trustworthy. 94 In addition, defense attorneys
should realize that a reviewing court will make analogies to existing
95
Guidelines in order to determine whether a departure is reasonable.
This procedure, however, may cause serious difficulties for defense attorneys because "the reasonableness of departure does not always dement was not compelled to furnish Kikumura with the evidence against him to
assure an informed and able cross-examination, and at the hearing, the Government was not burdened by the Federal Rules of Evidence and the responsibility
to prove each fact beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. (Rosenn, J., concurring).
For a discussion of the procedural protections available to defendants at trial
and at sentencing, see supra notes 29-36 and accompanying text.
89. Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1120 (Rosenn, J., concurring).
90. Id. (Rosenn,J., concurring). See GUIDELINES, supra note 1, § IBI.3(a)(4)
(conduct relevant to determining applicable guideline range includes "the defendant's state of mind, intent, motive and purpose in committing the offense").
91. Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1120 (Rosenn, J., concurring) (quoting FEDERAL
COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE TENTATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS
MENT, 62 (Dec. 22, 1989)).

FOR PUBLIC COM-

92. Id. at 1121 (Rosenn, J., concurring) (citing United States v. Roberts,

726 F. Supp. 1359, 1368 (D.D.C. 1989) (prosecution's selective transfer of certain cases from state to federal court violated due process), rev'd sub nom. United
States v. Doe, 934 F.2d 353 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 959 (1991)). According to Judge Rosenn, "What the Government appears to have done is to
deliberately collateralize at the charge and trial stage the most critical element

for this sentencing, Kikumura's specific intent in transporting the explosives."

Id. (Rosenn, J., concurring).
93. For a discussion of these heightened protections, see supra notes 37-55
and accompanying text.
94. For a discussion of the factfinding and hearsay issues, see supra notes
29-55 and accompanying text.
95. For a discussion of departure from the Guidelines, see supra notes 5684 and accompanying text.
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pend on ... mathematical precision." '9 6
Although the Kikumura court's method for determining the reasonableness of upward departures from the Guidelines is principled, its application may lead to sentencing disparity; a result that the Guidelines
were intended to avoid. 97 For example, the Kikumura court conceded
that its test for determining the reasonableness of departures is not precise. 9 8 Sometimes a district court will depart on the basis of conduct it
views as constituting a separate offense under the Guidelines. 9 9 Other
times, a district court will depart on the basis of aggravating conduct
that resembles specific offense characteristics.' 00 As the Third Circuit
noted, "competing analogies ... will be plausible, or a series of factors
will be present that cannot be neatly disentangled from one another and
analyzed component by component."'' * Thus, a danger exists that a
departure may, in fact, reflect an exercise of a judicial discretion under
10 2
the guise of an analogy to the Guidelines.
From the government's perspective, prosecutors must be sensitive
to avoid violating the due process clause by manipulating a charge to
gain an advantage in sentencing.' 0 3 Thus, if the government repeatedly
charges specific crimes in the indictment and repeatedly departs from
the Guidelines to take advantage of the lesser procedural protections
available to a defendant at sentencing, the government may be violating
1 4
the defendant's due process rights.
Gerard M. O'Rourke
96. Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1113 (quoting United States v. Shuman, 902 F.2d
873, 877 (11th Cir. 1990)). "We are dealing here with analogies to the guidelines, which are necessarily more open-textured than applications of the guidelines." Id.
97. The Guidelines state that "Congress sought uniformity in sentencing by

narrowing the wide disparity in sentences imposed by different federal courts for
similar criminal conduct by similar offenders." GUIDELINES, supra note 1, at 2.
98. Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1113.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. For a discussion of judicial discretion under the Guidelines, see supra
note 86.
103. See United States v. Roberts, 726 F. Supp. 1359, 1368 (D.D.C. 1989),
rev'd sub nom. United States v. Doe, 934 F.2d 353 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S.
Ct. 268 (1991).
104. See Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1121 (Rosenn, J., concurring).
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